Russia Is the Only Winner: $270 Million Per Day and Counting

Euromaidan Press ran the headline on March 20: "Russia couldn't fix its oil revenues. The US Air Force did it."

The numbers are obscene. Bloomberg reported on March 24 that Russia's weekly oil export revenue hit a four-year high, the highest since March 2022, right after the Ukraine invasion. Average daily Kremlin revenues from oil exports reached $270 million per day, double the January 2026 figure of approximately $135 million. Crude shipments averaged 3.6 million barrels per day in the four weeks to March 22, up 160,000 barrels from the previous month.

Before the Iran war, Russia was in genuine fiscal trouble. Urals crude had fallen to approximately $57 per barrel with a $30.62 discount to Brent, well below what Russia needed to balance its budget. Oil revenues nearly halved year-over-year in December 2025. The National Wealth Fund, Russia's sovereign wealth cushion, had been depleted by 55%, with liquid assets falling to $51.6 billion. The Central Bank was selling gold from reserves for the first time since 2002: 500,000 troy ounces (approximately 15.5 metric tons) in January-February alone, the largest bullion sale in over two decades.

Then the United States bombed Iran.

Brent surged above $100. Hormuz closed. Middle Eastern supply vanished from the market. And Russian crude, suddenly the only non-Gulf, non-OPEC major supply available to the world's largest importers, went from the cheapest barrel on the market to one of the most expensive.

S&P Global Platts assessed Urals crude delivered to India above forward Dated Brent on March 17, the first time since records began in 2023. By March 19, the spread widened to a $6 per barrel premium. An all-time record. The trajectory: pre-war discount of $30.62 below Brent → narrowed to $14 by March 6 → $9.30 by March 13 → flipped to a premium by March 17 → $6 premium by March 19.

Russian oil delivered to India surged over 100% in price while Brent rose 69%. The discount collapse was driven by Hormuz eliminating competing Gulf crude, the US sanctions waiver making Russian oil temporarily legal, and India's desperate need for non-Gulf supply. Russia went from pariah barrel to premium barrel in three weeks.

The US sanctions waiver, announced after the Dmitriev-Witkoff-Kushner meeting in Florida on March 12, covered 124-125 million barrels of Russian crude already loaded on ships. India snapped up 30 million barrels immediately and contracted another 60 million for April delivery, more than double February volumes. Total Indian commitments under the waiver: approximately 90 million barrels. Six of seven G7 leaders opposed the waiver. Germany called it "wrong." Former Obama sanctions lead Eddie Fishman called it the "first major relaxation of sanctions on Russia since 2014."

The Moscow Times headline on March 11 asked: "Did the Mideast conflict just rescue Russia's war budget?" The answer, a week later, was unambiguous. Russia paused planned changes to its budget rule because the oil price spike eased fiscal pressure, the clearest institutional confirmation that the windfall changed Russia's calculus. Putin told oil and gas executives on March 23 to use the windfall to "pay off their debt to domestic banks," framing it as fiscal responsibility rather than a war chest expansion, but the subtext was clear: this money is a rescue, not a strategy.

And while Russia profits, it feeds the war. The intelligence relationship is confirmed and escalating. Russia provides satellite imagery from its aerospace fleet, real-time US warship positions, and upgraded Shahed drone components (improved communications, navigation, and targeting systems) to Iran. The WSJ reported Russia is sharing tactical guidance from Ukraine war experience: how many drones to deploy, at what altitudes, strike patterns optimized against Western air defenses. A feedback loop: Russia field-tests Shahed adaptations over Ukraine, exports those lessons to Iran, Iran adapts.

Kremlin envoy Dmitriev proposed the quid-pro-quo to Witkoff and Kushner: Russia stops sharing intelligence with Iran if the US stops supporting Ukraine. Washington rejected it. The proposal's existence confirms the relationship. You can't offer to stop something you're not doing.

At the UN Security Council, Russia abstained on Resolution 2817 condemning Iran's attacks on Gulf states. Not vetoed. Abstained. Russia chose Gulf relationships over Iran protection. Its failed counter-resolution got 4 votes. The Ambassador to the UK later admitted outright: "We are not neutral."

Putin's strategy is the purest form of what our early analysis called "predatory neutrality." Publicly condemn the strikes. Privately share intelligence that prolongs the war. Collect the oil revenue from disrupted markets. Offer to mediate while simultaneously profiting from chaos. Let the US exhaust its interceptor stockpiles on Iranian drones while Russia continues bombing Ukraine with the same drones' upgraded variants.

The structural numbers: CREA calculated EUR 8-10 billion in additional fossil fuel revenue over the war's first 25 days. Full-year projection at $90 average Urals: $55 billion additional revenue. But the NWF continues depleting, 57% of the gold already sold, exhaustion projected by mid-2027 regardless of the windfall. The war provides a one-time rescue, not a cure. The chronic deficit remains. Russia is simultaneously the biggest short-term winner and a medium-term dead man walking, profiting spectacularly while selling the furniture to pay the mortgage.

The Central Bank posted a 184.8 billion ruble loss in 2025, victim of its own 21% interest rate, which killed bank borrowing from the CBR and slashed its income. Lukoil posted a 1.06 trillion ruble net loss, not operational collapse but a massive write-down of foreign assets forced by sanctions. The accounting is brutal even as the operational cash pours in.

Every interceptor fired in the Middle East is one that can't defend Ukraine. Every day of US attention consumed by Iran is a day nobody watches the Fortress Belt offensive. Every dollar of oil windfall extends Russia's war economy by weeks. The Iran war didn't just rescue Russia's budget. It rescued Russia's war.

And the United States made it happen.

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FAQ

Is Russia a co-belligerent?

Functionally, yes. Intelligence sharing that provides targeting data for strikes on US forces meets most definitions of co-belligerency under international law. The New Statesman assessed Russia is "a co-belligerent in all but name." The distinction is that Russia has not provided direct military forces or openly acknowledged the intelligence sharing (despite Iran's own FM confirming it). The legal ambiguity is deliberate.

Will the sanctions waiver be renewed after April 11?

Likely in some form. The oil market cannot absorb the simultaneous loss of Hormuz-trapped Gulf crude AND Russian crude under full sanctions enforcement. The choice is between $100 oil with Russian barrels flowing or $150+ oil without them. No US president survives $150 oil in a midterm year. The waiver may be repackaged or quietly extended.

Does the oil windfall actually save Russia long-term?

No. The NWF is 55% depleted and exhaustion is projected by mid-2027 even with the windfall. Russia's defense budget consumes 38% of all spending. The brain drain (650-920K departed since 2022) continues. The war economy is not sustainable beyond 2027-2028. The Iran windfall extends the runway by months, not years. Putin told executives to use it for debt repayment, not investment, an implicit admission that the money is a lifeline, not a foundation.