Who's Actually Running Iran?

Mojtaba Khamenei hasn't been seen in public since February 28. Twenty-five days and counting. He became Supreme Leader on March 9, sixteen days ago. In those sixteen days: no video, no audio, no confirmed photograph. No video. No audio. No confirmed photograph. A Nowruz written statement was released through his Telegram channel on March 21, accompanied by photos that the CIA is actively trying to confirm are recent. The regime has been recycling old images. A US official described the situation as "beyond weird." An Israeli official was blunter: "We have no evidence that he is really the one giving orders."

A source in Tehran told The Media Line that Mojtaba's first written statement as Supreme Leader was "drafted by the IRGC and later rewritten in Mojtaba's style." The statement contained typographical errors, the kind that happen when a document passes through multiple hands and nobody properly proofreads the final version because the person whose name is on it isn't the person who wrote it.

Iranian opposition channels on social media noticed something else, though this claim is unverified by independent forensic analysis. They allege the official signature on Mojtaba's second administrative document is pixel-identical to the signature on his first. If true, this is functionally impossible with a live hand signature and trivially easy with a stamp or digital reproduction.

So who is actually running Iran?

How did the IRGC take over?

The answer is three men. All IRGC veterans. None elected by anyone.

Ahmad Vahidi became IRGC Commander-in-Chief on March 1, three days after the strikes killed Khamenei the elder. Vahidi is a former Quds Force commander (1988-1997), a former defense minister under Ahmadinejad, and is wanted by Interpol for his alleged role in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people. He was one of the key figures who campaigned to install Mojtaba as Supreme Leader. The US State Department put a $10 million bounty on him within days of his appointment.

Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr was appointed Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council on March 24, replacing the assassinated Ali Larijani. Zolghadr is a former IRGC deputy commander and former deputy interior minister under Ahmadinejad. Al Jazeera's analysis noted his appointment signals Iran is "adding more military layers to the national security establishment." Larijani was the pragmatist, the negotiator, the man with a philosophy PhD who wrote three books on Kant. Zolghadr is a career security operative. The replacement tells you everything about the direction of travel.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is the Parliament Speaker and the man who, according to three senior Iranian officials who spoke to the New York Times, "assumed the responsibility of strategic decision making" after Larijani's killing. He's a former IRGC Air Force commander, former Tehran mayor, and the designated counterpart for JD Vance in the potential Islamabad talks. CNN reported the US is "quietly weighing" him as "a potential partner and even a future leader."

Vahidi commands the military. Zolghadr runs security. Ghalibaf handles politics and diplomacy. Mojtaba provides constitutional legitimacy. President Pezeshkian, the elected civilian, has been systematically marginalized. His VP informed officials of plans to take charge "during wartime" with no mention of Pezeshkian's ability to carry out presidential duties.

This is a military junta wearing clerical robes.

What's happening to the regular army?

The IRGC's consolidation hasn't just sidelined civilians. It's breaking the regular military.

Iran International reported a 14% desertion rate in key western border Artesh (regular army) units. That's not a slow trickle. It's a structural collapse of unit cohesion in the areas closest to the fighting. IRGC personnel are reportedly refusing to transport wounded Artesh soldiers to hospitals. Some Artesh units have been issued only 20 bullets per two soldiers. Field units are operating without reliable drinking water or food. "Group desertions" (soldiers leaving bases together for nearby towns) have been documented.

Israel National News published analysis on "how to weaponize Iran's 14% desertion rate." The institutional rift between the IRGC and the regular army isn't a side story. If the war continues another two to three weeks, the Artesh could functionally cease to exist as a fighting force, leaving only the IRGC, which is exactly what the IRGC wants.

An Israeli ambassador told Bloomberg that "individual IRGC and Basij units have begun refusing to report for duty." He described these as "the first cracks," "not yet deep fissures, but the process is moving in that direction." On the streets of Iranian cities, opposition channels reported armed clashes between IRGC and Basij formations. And a separate rift has opened between the IRGC and FARAJA (Iranian police), whose officers complain they're doing the "dirty work" of suppressing protests while Israeli drones pick them off "almost like at a shooting gallery."

Why does the Mosaic Defense structure make this harder to end?

Early in the war, the IRGC activated its Mosaic Defense doctrine, splitting into 31 autonomous provincial commands. Each provincial commander has "full authority to fire missiles, launch drones, or carry out guerrilla raids" without central approval. Foreign Minister Araghchi admitted that the Oman and Nakhchivan strikes "were not our choice" and that some military units are "independent and somewhat isolated, operating only on pre-issued general instructions."

The Soufan Center assessed that Mosaic Defense makes decapitation "virtually impossible. You would need to defeat 31 separate forces." Each unit is entrenched in familiar terrain. The doctrine was designed by former IRGC Commander Jafari as a "Fourth Successor" strategy, seamlessly transitioning into protracted insurgency if a base is lost.

The internet blackout, now in its 25th day at approximately 1% connectivity, has made this worse, not better. With the National Information Network severed from the global internet, the reversion to analog communications means these 31 units are operating with more autonomy than intended. The decentralization that was supposed to be a survival feature has become a command-and-control problem.

This is the question that should keep Vance up on the plane to Islamabad: even if Ghalibaf agrees to a ceasefire, can he deliver 31 autonomous commands? The Foreign Minister already admitted he can't control all of them. A deal signed at the table that doesn't hold on the ground isn't a deal. It's a press release.

Is Mojtaba alive?

US intelligence says yes. Iranian officials have tried to arrange meetings in his name. But "alive" and "governing" are different things.

The injury reports are contradictory. CNN's source says a fractured foot, bruised eye, minor facial cuts. Al-Jarida (Kuwaiti) says he lost a leg. Hegseth claimed he was "wounded and likely disfigured." Unverified reports placed him in a Moscow hospital. The Kremlin "declined to comment," which is notably not a denial.

Opposition bloggers went further, claiming "severe neurological complications from brain damage" and a "reduced consciousness" state connected to a ventilator for over ten days. His first Nowruz message, when Supreme Leaders traditionally speak on camera, was text only.

We don't know. We genuinely don't know. And that uncertainty is itself a structural feature of the crisis. A Supreme Leader who may be a vegetable being propped up by the IRGC's Telegram channel while three generals run the country. That's not a government. It's a front. And fronts are harder to negotiate with than governments because there's nobody behind the desk who can sign anything and make it stick.

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FAQ

Could the Assembly of Experts replace Mojtaba?

Technically yes. Article 111 provides for a Provisional Leadership Council if the Supreme Leader is incapacitated. But the Assembly already selected Mojtaba under wartime conditions (voting online after Israel bombed their Qom office). All 88 seats are hardliners. There's no incentive to admit incapacitation. It would trigger another succession crisis during wartime and make the new leader an immediate assassination target.

Who is Pezeshkian and does he matter?

Masoud Pezeshkian is the elected President of Iran. He has been systematically marginalized since the war began. His ceasefire conditions (recognition, reparations, guarantees) are formally operative but carry no weight because the IRGC controls military operations and Ghalibaf controls strategic decision-making. Pezeshkian's role is to make phone calls with foreign leaders (Modi, Macron) and issue statements that the IRGC may or may not honor.

If the IRGC is running Iran, why does Mojtaba matter at all?

Constitutional legitimacy. The Islamic Republic's entire legal structure flows from the Supreme Leader's authority. Laws, military orders, judicial appointments, foreign policy: all derive from the velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist). Without a functioning Supreme Leader, the system has no legal basis. Mojtaba is the signature on the document. The IRGC is the hand that moves the pen.